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QUASI CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY FOR WORK
AND LABOR; EFFECT OF FAMILY RELATION
Some recent Pennsylvania' decisions justify an in-
quiry into an interesting problem of the law of quasi con-
tracts: when may there be, in the absence of a contractual
agreement, express or implied, a recovery for services rend-
ered or work and labor, and what is the effect upon such
a recovery if the plaintiff and defendant are relatives or
members of the same household?
Some preliminary observations are essential. A fund-
amental principle of the law of quasi contracts affirms that
in order to establish the existence of a quasi contractual
obligation, it must be shown that (1) the defendant has
received a benefit from the plaintiff, and (2)) the retention
of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable under all the
circumstances of the case.2 The quasi contractual obliga-
tion imposes upon the defendant the duty to pay the plain-
tiff the reasonable value of the benefit thus received.
1 Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485; Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19.
2 Woodward on Quasi Contraacts, P. 9. This is also called In
quasi contracts "recovery under the doctrine, of unjust enrich-
ment." See Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 H. L. R. 1, 53.
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If, in the absence of any contractual agreement be-
tween the parties, the plaintiff voluntarily and without re-
quest performs services for the defendant, it is generally
held that the plaintiff cannot recover, on the theory that
under such circumstances it is not inequitable or unfair for
the defendant to retain the benefit conferred upon him by
the plaintiff without therefor. In other words, the defend-
ant in such case is not unjustly enriched at the expense of
the plaintiff. This general proposition is true whether the
plaintiff was an officious or non-officious volunteer, al-
though the courts might well permit recovery where the
plaintiff acted non-officiously, and at the time of rendering
the services expected remuneration and did not intend a
gratuity.
To the above mentioned principle there are some ex-
ceptions in which recovery is permitted for services volunt-
arily rendered without request, but it is to be noted that in
each instance the plaintiff expected remuneration and did
not act officiously. For example, it has been held that the
plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of his services
rendered without request, the performance of which was
the legal duty of the defendant, and which the plaintiff has
been constrained to render, to maintain or protect his own
rights or interests.4 Again, the plaintiff may recover the
3 See, e. g., Mayer v. Rhoades, 135 Pa. 601; Anderson v. Hamil-
ton, 25 Pa. 75; Force v. Haines, 17 N. J. L. 385. One who voluntar-
Ily submits plans, etc., 'ith a view to obtaining an order for work,
cannot recover therefor, Webb v. School, 3 Phila. 125, and cases
cited in Woodward on Quasi Contracts, p. 75.
4 As for example, where a tenant installs fire escapes to pre-
vent hig liability for injuries to patrons, and an ordinance has im-
posed the duty of so doing upon the owner. One who unofficiously
provides for the burial of another may recover the expenses from
the person upon whom the primary duty rests, Patterson v. Patter-
son, 59 N, Y. 574; Constantinides v. Walsh, 146 Mass. 281. One
who supplies necessaries to a pauper can recover therefor from a
town whose legal duty it is to support the pauper and the offigers
have refused to do so, Cincinnati v. Ogden, 5 Ohio 23. On the same
ground, one who supplies neecssaries to a wife or child may recover
therefor from the husband or parent.
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value of work, etc., voluntarily performed without request,
which the defendant had contracted to do for and with a
close relative.5 It has also been held that if the plaintiff
makes repairs necessary for the preservation of lost prop-
erty of the defendant, the latter is liable for the reasonable
value of what the plaintiff has done upon acceptance of the
property from the finder.6 The recipient of professional
medical services, necessary for the preservation of life or
,:health, even though rendered without request, is liable for
the reasonable value thereof.7  On the other hand, a lay-
man could not recover for such services because his act
-would be prompted by humanitarian instincts and not by
an expectancy of pay.
It must be admitted that the foregoing general principle
that there can be no recovery for services voluntarily rend-
ered without request is largely sustainable on the ground
that the plaintiff acted without the defendant's request.
Therefore, even though there be no proof of any request,
there may be evidence of other facts which will take the
place of request or from which request may be inferred,
and if this is so, the plaintiff may recover, unless it is shown
that he did not expect remuneration. A defendant cannot
be unjustly enriched at the expence of a plaintiff who had
no expectancy of pay. Accordingly it has been held that
where the plaintiff performs services for the defendant,
either with or without the latter's knowledge and consent,
and he knowingly accepts and avails himself of these ser-
vices, being in a position to accept or refuse them at his
option, he is liable for the reasonable value thereof.8 And
5 Forsyth v. Ganson, 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 558; Case v. Case, 203 N.
Y. 263.
6 Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286. Accord, Bryant's Estate,
180 Pa. 192, where an agent in sole charge of his principal's estate
was allowed compensation for caring for the estate after the death
of the principal, who died suddenly without leaving known heirs.
7 McGuirev. Hughes, 126 App. Div. (N.Y.) 637.
8 Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. 367; Moyer's Appeal, 112 Pa. 290;
Moreland v. Davidson, 71 Pa. 371.
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one who assents to or acquiesces in the rendition of services
for him by another is liable to pay what they are reason-
ably worth.9
Passing to cases in which it affirmatively appears that
the plaintiff was requested by the defendant to perform the
services, it is generally held that where one renders ser-
vices for another who accepts them, the latter is liable for
the reasonable value thereof.10 It must be noted parenth-
etically that such liability is dependent upon* the acceptance
of the services by the defendant, which may be shown by
his voluntary acceptance of work which is capable of reject-
ion or by theeincorporation of the paintiff's services or work
in something already owned by the defendant or where the
work is for some similar reason incapable of rejection. Un-
til acceptance by the defendant, he has received no benefit,
and there can be, as noted above, no unjust enrichment nor
the impostion of a quasi contractual obligation. It is true
in this class of cases, as in any other cases which rely up-
on quasi contract principles, that there can be no unjust en-
richment of the defendant and therefore no recovery by
the plaintiff where it appears that at the time of rendering
the services the plaintiff did not expect any remuneration
for what he was doing." On the other hand, the jury, be-
fore finding a veridct for the plaintiff, must be satisfied
that he did expect remuneration. Expectancy of pay in
some form at the time of rendering the services or perform-
ing the work of conferring any other benefit is an import-
ant part of the plaintiff's case. If the plaintiff at the time
of rendering the services did not intend to charge for them,
9 Hughes v. Dundee Co., 21 Fed. 169.
10 Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161; Conklin v. Kruger, 79 N.
J. L. 326; and cases cited infra, and in 40 Cyc 2810.
11 E. g., where services are rendered by reason of friendship
or from kindly, charitable or humane motives. Bartholomew v.
Jackson, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 28, saving property from destruction by
fire; Kelly v. Chemical Co., 162 Mich. 525, semble; Van Buren -.
Reformed Church, 62 Barb. (N.Y.) 495, services as church organist.
See also Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 468.
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it is immaterial that subsequently changed his mind and
decided to ask remuneration. 2 His testimony at the time
of trial that he expected pay is of little value if the circum-
stances at the time he rendered the serviced or performed
the work show that he intended a gratuity. 3 A careful dis-
tinction must also be made between expectation of pay and
disappointed expectations. In the former case the plaintiff
performs services beneficial to the defendant and expects
compensation therefor in some form or other. In the latter
case the plaintiff does not expect pay for his services, but
expects that because of his services, gratuitously rendered,
his donee will reciprocate his generosity or indirectly re-
ward him. In such cases there can be no recovery.! A
third situation may occur. The plaintiff may expect and
rely on a right to compensation, but with an intention not
to enforce his supposed right to expected pay in the event
of an anticipated reciprocation or reward. In such cases
the plaintiff has been held entitled to recovery. 5 In any
event, however, the defendant is not liable unless it appears
that remuneration was expected from him. If a benefit is
conferred without intention of charging the recipient, but in
the expectation of payment from a third party, the recip-
ient is not liable."
As stated at the beginning of the preceding paragraph,
a plaintiff can recover the reasonable value of what he has
done, if he can show (1) request by the defendant, (2)
rendition of beneficial services, and (3) acceptance by the
12 Clark's Estate, 12 Phila. 147.
13 Supra, note 12.
14 Collyer v. Collyer, 113 -N. Y. 442; LeFontan v. Hayhurst,
89 Me. 388, services rendered in expectation of marriage; Little v.
Rawson, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 111; Walker's Estate, 3 Rawle (Pa-) 243;
Davidson v. Davidson, 13 N. J. Eq. 246, all cases of disappointed
expectation of legacy.
15 Grandin v. Reading' Admr., 10 N. 3. Eq. 370; Cook v.
Bates, 88 Me. 455.
16 Dodge v. Traction Co., 152 Mich 100; Coleman v. U. S. 152
U. S. 96.
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defendant. If plaintiff's expectation of remuneration at the
time of rendering the services is an important element of
his recovery, and if recovery is permitted upon proof of the
facts outlined above, it necessarily follows that expectancy
of pay will be inferred or presumed from the three facts
above mentioned. The plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case by showing request, rendition of services and accept-
ance, which can be defeated by proof, probably by the de-
fendant, of such facts as would lead the jury to believe that
the plaintiff did not, as a matter of fact, expect remuneration
when he rendered the services.
Another interesting problem, closely akin to the present
inquiry, presents itself at this point. Suppose that the
plaintiff performs services beneficial to the defendant who
accepts them, and then subsequently the defendant promises
to pay for the services. The plaintiff cannot recover upon
the subsequent promise itself, as it is supported by a past
consideration, the services previously rendered. It cannot
be controverted that a past consideration will not support
a subsequent promise. But from the facts of rendition of
services, acceptance thereof, and the subsequent promise
of the defendant to pay, the jury is warranted in inferring
that there was a previous request by the defendant, and the
plaintiff will recover the reasonable value of the services
unless the defendant can show that he did not request the
services as a matter of fact.17 The presumption of previous
request, together with the other facts outlined, will entitle
the plaintiff to recover, as shown in the previous paragraphs
unless, of course, the plaintiff did not expect remuneration
for his services.
All of the preceding discussion leads to the more spec--
ific problem suggested by the writer what is the effect
upon the plaintiff's right to recover the value of his services,
etc., if he and the defendant are relatives or members of
the same household? In the first place, it must be conced-
17 Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa. 95; see also Paul v. Stackhouse,
38 Pa. 302; Sutch's Estate, 201 'Pa. 305.
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ed, in accordance with the foregoing discussion, that if the
plaintiff renders the services without any request or pro-
mise on the part of the defendant, or if it affirmatively ap-
pears that the plaintiff did not expect any remuneration,
then the plaintiff cannot recover. Suppose, however, that
the defendant requests the services, the plaintiff performs
them, and the defendant accepts the benefit thereof. Ord-
inarily, as outlined above, proof of these three important
facts warrants the inference or presumption that the plain-
tiff expected remuneration and permits recovery. But proof
of a sufficienty close blood or family relationship will either
rebut the presumption of expectation of pay or raise, on the
contrary, a presumption, fatal to the paintiff, that he in-
tended to render the services gratuitously. In such an event
therefore, the burden would be upon the plaintiff to show
affirmatively that he did expect remuneration when he
rendered the services.
Accordingly, it is generally held, as was well stated in
Disbrow v. Durand,.' that "ordinarily, where services are
rendered and voluntarily accepted, the law will imply a
promise on the part of the recipient to pay for them; but
where the services are rendered by members of a family,
living as one household, to each other, there will be no such
implication, from the mere rendition and acceptance of the
services. In order to recover for the services, the plaintiff
must affirmatively show either (1) that an express contract
for the remuneration existed, or (2) that the circumstances
under which the services were rendered were such as exhitit
a reasonable and proper expectation that there would be
compensation. The reason of this exception to the ordinary
rule is that the household family relationship is presumed
to abound in reciprocal acts of kindness and good will,
which tend to the mutual comfort and convenience of the
members of the family, and are gratuitously performed;
and, where that relationship appears, the ordinary impli-
18 54 N. J. L. 343.
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cation of a promise to pay for services does not arise, be-
cause the presumption which supports such implication
is nullified by the presumption that between members of
a household services are gratuitously rendered. The proof
of the services, and, as well, of the family relation, leaves
the case in equipoise, from which the plaintiff must remove
it or fail."'
It is purposed, therefore, to ascertain what blood or
family relationship is sufficient to rebut and nullify the pre-
sumption of expectation of pay, and raise in its place a pre-
sumption that the plaintiff intended to render the services
gratituously, and then in to turn show how the plaintiff can
overcome that presumption of gratuity by affirmative proof
of such "circumstances as exhibit a reasonable and proper
expectation of compensation."
In the first place, the mere fact of relationship between
the parties, by blood or affinity, will not overcome the pre-
sumption of expectation of pay and raise in its place the
presumption of gratuitous services, except in the case of
parent and child.20 Accordingly, services performed by a
child for a parent are presumed to be gratuitous, and prima
facie there can be no recovery,2e unless the presumpnon is
overcome as shown below. The same rule applies to ser-
vices performed by an adult child living with its father as
part of his family;22 and to services rendered by a parent
19 For cases In accord, sbe notes Infra, and Woodward on Quasi
Contracts, p. 84. See especially Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485; Brown
v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19.
20 "Relationship alone Is sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion (of expectation of pay), only In the case of parent and child,"
Gibb's Estate, supra, note 19, and see also Brown v. McCurdy, supra
note 19.
21 Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229; Ulrich v. Arnold,
120 Pa. 170; Houck v. Houck, 99 Pa. 552; Titman v. Titman, 64 Pa.
480; Mosteller's Appeal, 30 Pa. 473; Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465;
Walker's Estate, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 243. The same prlncipled apply to
husband and wife and persons living together as such.
22 Houck v. Houck, 99 Pa. 552; Patton v. Conn, 114 Pa. 183.
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to a child,23 and also to services rendered to one standing
in loco parentis to the plaintiff.24
If the parties are related, other than as parent and
child, by blood or affinity, the mere fact of their relation-
ship will not rebut the presumption of expectation of pay
for services rendered, and this rule has been applied in cases
where the parties were related as step-parent and step-
child;25 grand-parent and grand-child;sB brother and sister;27
parent-in-law and child-in-law;2 uncle or aunt and nephew
or neice;29 cousins; " or by marriage, such as sister-in-law
and brother-in-law.3 '
But if persons, thus related by blood or marriage,
(except, of course, parent and child,) are members of the
same family, living together as one household, render ser-
vices, etc., to each other, then the presumption of expecta-
tion of pay is overcome and there rises in its place a pre-
sumption of gratuity.32 But it must appear that they are
members of the same family33 and not merely living under
the same roof. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Brown
23 Cummings v. Cummings, 8 Watts (Pa.) 366; accord, where
plaintiff was in loco parentis, Horton's Appeal, 94 Pa. 62.
24 Fross' Appeal, 105 Pa. 258; Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19.
25 Satterly v. Dewick, 197 N. Y. 599; Guss' Estate, 2 Chest. Co.
(Pa.) 65.
26 Barhite's Appeal, 126 Pa. 404; See also Moyer's Appeal, 112
Pa. 290.
27 Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. 367.
28 Gerz v. Weber, 151 Pa. 396; McHenry's Appeal, 148 Pa. 575;
Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107.
29 Davies' Estate, 60 Pa, Super. 360; Evans' Estate, 60 Pa.
Super. 83.
30 Neal v. Gilmore, 79 Pa. 421.
31 Caskey v. Kineavy; 60 Pa. Super. 87; Hatfield's Estate, 50
Pa. Super. 450.
32 Gerz v. Weber, 151 Pa, 396; McHenry's Appeal, 148 Pa.
575; Moyer's Appeal, 112 Pa. 290.
33 "Family", at law, Is a collective body of persons who live
In one home, under one head or management, Birch v. Birch, 112
Mo. 157.
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v. McCurdy,"' said, "The mere fact of relationship raises
no presumption of gratuitous services, but if the plaintiff has
become part of the family, the contrary is true."35 While
near relatives are the persons most frequently forming a
household these principles are not confined to them, but
are applicable where one is taken into a family and there-
after treated as a member thereof, whether a relative or
not. 6
If by reason of the relationship of the parties, either as
parent and child or as members of the same family, a pre-
sumption arises that the plaintiff's services were gratuitous,
it is then necessary for him to introduce evidence to over-
come that presumption. In the case of parent and child, it is
said that the presumption of gratuity can only be rebutted to
permit the plaintiff to recover where he can show an express
contract "7 or promise"8 to pay, or such "circumstances so
direct and strong"3 9 as to establish a contract. The evid-
ence must be "direct and positive"40 or "clear and dis-
tinct." ' and it is error to charge the jury that the evidence
must merely be "clear and satisfactory."' 2 While state-
ments and declarations of a parent with reference to the
value and importance of service rendered by his child or
showing an intention to make compensation therefor, are
to be considered in determining the right to compensation,
34 278 Pa. 19.
35 See also Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485. Nephew visiting hi1s
aunt is not a member of the family, Brown's Estate, 6 Pa. Co. Ct.
428.
36 Dunlap v. Allen, 90 Il. 108; Gillan Y. O'Leary, 124 App. Dlv.
(N. Y.) 498.
37 Titman v. Titman, 64 Pa. 480; Watson v. Stem, 76 Pa. 121;
Miller's Appeal, 100 Pa. 568; Ulrich v. Arnold, 120 Pa. 170; Zimmer-
man v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229.
38 Maitland v. Greer, 8 Pa. Super. 461.
39 Miller's Appeal, 100 Pa. 568.
40 Bash v. Bash, 9 Pa. 260.
41 Titman v. Titman, 64 Pa. 480.
42 Supra, note 40.
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yet loose general statements or declarations of gratitude
or affection on the part of the parent, or mere general
statements of an intention to make compensation, or that
he decired the child to be paid, or that the child ought to
be paid for such services, do not entitle the child to re-
covery. 3 But services rendered by a son to a father, at
the latter's request, on the basis of master and servant, con-
stitute a ground for recovery.4 Also, a son, living apart
from his father, may recover for services rendered at the
latter's request, such as are not usually rendered gratuit-
ously by a son.45
Where the existence of a family relation raises the
presumption that services rendered were gratuitous, the pre-
sumption must be overcome by the plaintiff by proof of an
express contract,46 although the proof thereof need not be
so direct and strict as in the case of parent and child.4
7
"The closer the relatioship, the less expectation of payment,
and greater strictness of proof to overcome the presumption
is required."48s It is sometimes said that the presumption
of gratuity may be rebutted by proof of (1) an express con-
tract, or (2) such additional circumstances as show that the
plaintiff did actually expect payment.
4 9
43 Leidig v. Coover, 47 Pa. 534; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman,
129 Pa. 229; Ulrich v. Arnold, 120 Pa. 170, in which the court said.
"If a child expects to be paid for filial services to a parent, let
him enter into a specific and definite contract with the parent."
44 Steel v. Steel, 12 Pa. %4; Titman v. Titman, 64 Pa. 480.
45 Young's Estate, 32 PItts. L. J. 403.
46 E. g.,, in Gerz v. Demarra, 162 Pa. 530; Brown's Appeal,
112 Pa. 18.
47 Gerz v. Demarra, supra, note 46.
48 Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485.
49 See especially Disbrow v. Durand, 54 N. J. L. 343; Raning-
er's Appeal, 118 Pa. 20; Gibb's Estate, supra, note 48.
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KNIGHT v. SHAW
Prowissory Notes-Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194-Negotiable In-
struments-Transfer of Note as Collateral for Pre-Existing
Debt--Fraud-Consideration
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case at bar are as follows: Shaw made a note
for $375, payable to X or order. It was agreed that X should uso
the proceeds of the discount of the note in a business in which Shaw
and X were jointly interested. Instead X endorsed It to Knight,
a creditor, as collateral security for several debts to Knight. Shaw
contends that Knight cannot recover unless he shows, (a) that he
knew nothing of the fraud In indorsing the note to him; (b) that
he was a purchaser for value (c) that he was not such a purohaser
on simply receiving the note as collateral security. The court so
charged, and also that, on Knight was a duty to show what the
consideration was.
?erlstein, for Plaintiff.
Kahaner, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
McMenamin J. From the facts of this case we think that the
charge of the learned court below was incorrect. It clearly appears
that Knight took the note as collateral security for a pre-existing
debt; this in our opinion constituted value. Sec. 25 of the Negot-
iable Instruments Act, Provides: (value is any consideration suffici-
ent to support a simple contract. An antecedent or per-existing
debt constitutes value;) this rule Is supported by the case of Schim-
mel vs Cohen Appl., 275 Pa. 117.
The, fact that Knight took the note as colateral security
waives the defense of want of consideration. This was so held
in the case of W. Rt. Smith vs. C. 0. Wachob, & J. I. Hlme, 179
Pa. 260.
In the case of Whipple vs Louis, 74 Pa. Sup.148, In an action
on a promissory note, every holder Id deemed prima facia, to be a
holder in due course, but If defendant proves that the paper was
put into circulation by fraud or undue means, his defense will pre-
vail, unless the plaintiff establishes the fact, that he or the person
under whom he claims, has acquired title as a holder for value
without notice.
Sec. 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, May 16, 1901; P.
L. 201. A holder in due courdb Is a holder who has taken the in-
strument under the following conditions: (1) that it Is complete and
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regular on its face, (2) that he became a holder of it before it was
ever due, and without notice that it had been previously dis-
honored, if such was the fact, (3) that he took it in good faith and
for value, (4) that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
or the persons negotiating it.
We think that Knght was a holder in due course within the
provision of this section.
Therefor we think that Knight was a purchaser for value,
and a, holder in due course, and receiving the note as collateral
security for a pre-existing debt constituted sufficient considera-
ton; and therefor it was not the duty of the plaintiff to show
what the consideration really was. Therefor the charge of the
lower court was erroneous, and in view of the foregoing facts -we
grant a new trial for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The note was given, to be used in a manner, In respect to
which the defendant had a special interest. Instead, the payee en-
dorsed it to a, creditor of his own as additional security for a debt,
not in payment of it.
Thid endorsement was a fraud on the defendant, and obliged
the plaintiff to show that he bought the note for value and in ig-
norance of the fraud.
Did the plaintiff become a purchaser for value by receiving the
note as additional security for the payment of the debt?
If the law was not in this matter changed by the Neg. Inst.
Act of 1901, such reception did not make the plaintiff a holder for
value. Courts of different jurisdictions took antagonistic views on
the subject, those of the United States, and of a great number of
states held that simply receiving additional secur.ty was giving a
consideration. Those of New York and Pennsylvania held the -op-
posite view. It might have been expected that when a number of
lawyers undertook to prepare a uniform law on the subject, they
should have been reasonably explicit and that their language would
be precise. Instead they say "Value is any consideration sufficient
to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt,
constitutes value." Sect. 25, P. L. 199. Cf. 21 Dick. L. R. p.
45. But, the judges seem to hold that this language does not
change the former law on this subject in Pennsylvania. 2d Nat.
Bank v. Hoffwan, 229 Pa. 429; Raken v. Henry, 16 Dist. Rep. 207
(Von Moschzisker, J.) and Horrell v. Reeves & Nelson, 72 Super.
29. By this decision, they frustrate the aim of the legislature to
make the law concerning negotiable instruments, uniform in the
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several dtates, and they impose an unnatural meaning on the words
of that statute.
In Schimmel v. Cohen, 275 Pa. 117, quoted by the learned
court below, It was not merely a pre-existing debt, but "an exten-
sion of time for payment" that furnished the consideration. In
Smith v. Hine, 179 Pa. 260, the question was different from the
present. The court says "The maker or endorser of accommoda-
tion paper may defend on the ground of fraud in the procurement
or use of the note."
Since, then, no consideration was paid by the plaintiff, be it
not a holder for value, and cannot therefore, enforce the payment
of the note, against the defrauded maker.
ENRY DOLAN v. DUNCAN
Trust and Trustees--Deed of Trust-Passive Trus6-Statut. of
Limitations-Rule in Shelley's Case
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Land was conveyed to X in trust for John Dolan and his child-
ren, their heirs and assigns. John had then but one child; tbr.e
were born later, one of whom, Henry, is the plaintiff. During John's
lifetime, Duncan entered on the land, having no claim to it, but a
forged deed purporting to have been made by John Dolan. Fitteen
yeard after possession was taken, John Dolan died; ton years have
elapsed since his death, during which Duncan's possession has oon-
tned.
Melevage, for the Plaintiff.
Schwartz, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Parsons, J. This is an action of ejectment for an undivided one-
fourth interest in land. The facts follow: Land was conveyed to X
in truet for John Dolan and his children, their heirs and assigns.
John had then but one child; three were born later, one of whom,
Henry, is the plaintiff. During John's lifetime, Duncan entered
on the land, havng no clam to It, but a forged deed purporting to
have been made by John Dolan. Fifeteen years after possession was
taken, John Dolan died; ten years have elapsed since his death.
during which Duncan's possession has continued.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the rule in Shelley's
case is applicable to the case at bar. The rule has been defined
thus: "If, after a limitation to a person of an estate for life there
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be limited by the same Instrument an estate in the form of a
remainder to his heirs, he will take an estate in remainer in fee and
the life estate previously limited to him will merge therein unless
there be another estate Interposed which will prevent the merger."
Tiffany, Real Property, p. 305. If the rule in Shelley's case were
applicable, John Dolan, the grantee, would take a fee because of
the merger which would take place. But the rule does not apply
when the words "heir" or "heirs" Is used to designate children,
or other definite individuals. The word "children" is prima facia
a word of purchase and not of limitation, and in the conveyance
in this case, the Intention of the grantor is manifest that he intend-
ed that the children were to take from him as by purchase and not
by descent from their father, John Dolan.
Tiffany, Real Property, page 305.
Chambers vs. Trust Co., 235 Pa. 610.
McCormick vs. Sypher 238 Pa. 185.
As to the defendant's contention, that whatever remedy the
plaintiff might have had is barred by the Statute of Limitations
which has run against his equitable estate, we must say that it is
untenable. The plantiff, as one of the remaindermen, had no right
of possession until the death of his father, when the life estate ter-
minated. Consequently, then, and not before, could he sue for tres-
pass or other possessory rghts; a fortiori, any adverse holding as
to him might commence running from this date, and not previous
thereto.
"A possession cannot be regarded as hostile to one who, owing
to the fact that he has no right of -possession, cannot sue to pro-
tect it, and consequently until the death of a tenant for life, the
statute does not begin to run against a remainderman in favor of a
third person."
Tiffany, Real Property, Page 1012,
Davus vs. Dickson, 92 Pa. 365.
McCormick vs. Sypher, 238 Pa. 185.
We think that the plaintiff has established the legal title
sufficiently to warrant entry of judgment in his behalf and we so
order.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
X was a dry trustee, having' no duties to perform. The con-
veyance to him waS, in effect, a conveyance to John Dolan and his
children, their heirs and assigns. At the time of the conveyance,
Dolan had but one child. Three were born later. What estate
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was given? The gift to children, was, in part, to non-ezistent chil-
dren. Children Is not a word of limitation. It does not qualify
the estate given to John Dolan. It describes persons who are to
take, either simultaneously with, or in succession to him. We think
it describes the latter. John Dolan receives a life estate. The re-
mainder is given to his children. Cf. McCormick v. Sypher, 233
Pa. 186.
The deed purporting to be from John Dolan to Duncan was a
forgery. No rights were granted by it. Nevertheless Duncan took
possession, and retained it 15 years, when Dolan died. The chil-
dren then acquired the right to the possession. The previous pos-
session of Duncan, while adverse to John Dolan, was not adverse
to the children.
The possession of Duncan however, continued for 10 years.
This continued possession was adverse to the children. But
it lasted only 10 yeard. In order to defeat their right, it must last
at least 21 years. It is evident then that the title of the children
has not been defeated. The plaintiff must recover.
The disposal of the case by the learned court below is affirmed
AFFIRMIED.
PARSONS v. PUGH
Execution-Real Estate-Revival of Judgment-Liens--Collateral
Attacks
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Edwards recovered against Parsond a judgment for ;900, Aug,.
16, 1912. On May 7th, 1919, an execution was issued on the judg-
ment and Parson's land was sold to Pugh for $700 by the sheriff.
All of this sum in excess of the costs was paid to Edwards, the
plantiff In the judgment. Pugh had possession. Denying that lie
obtaned a good title by the sheriff's sale, the judgment not having
been revived, Parsons brings this ejectment.
Culbertson, for Plaintiff.
Goodis, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Feinstein, J.-The judgment under which the sale was made
was recovered aganst Parsons on Aug. 6, 1912. An executon was
issued on the judgment on May 7, 1919. Parsons' land was sold to
the defendants for $700 by the sheriff. From this brief statement
of facts, It will be perceived that more than six (6) years elapsed
between the rendition of the judgment and the date of the sheriff's
sale.
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The plantiff's contention is in regard to the effect of the sale
made by the sheriff, the sole objection being that the judgment,
not being revived, passes no title to the reality.
The queston for determination by this court is-whether or
not an execution sale on a judgment which stands on record for
more than six years without being revived passes title to the realty
sold under such sale. This quedton has been more than once con-
sidered and, as we think, anomalously decided. It will, therefore,
be more than necessary to refer to the cases in which the doctrine
has been reviewed.
As early as the agreement, called fundamental laws, settled in
England, between Willam Penn and the freeman and planters of
the province of Pennsylvania, it was established .......... That all
lands and goods should be liable to pay debts, except where there
is legal issue, and then all goods and one third of the land only.
In 1682 the liability was extended by the legislature of the infant
community, to one half of the lands, purchased before the debts
were contracted, where there was issue. Thid principle of liability
was further extended in 1688, when it was enacted that all the land-
and houses of a debtor should be liable to sale upon judgment and
execution; with a saving of one year after judgment obtained in
favour of the mansion tract of the debtor. This statute which was
limited to one year, was re-enacted in 1695, wthout limitation and
again repeated a substance by the act of 1700. Most of these statu-
tes will be found collected in the very elaborate opinion delivered
by the late Mr. Justice Kennedy, ino Bellas vs McCarty, 10 W. 31.
Under the common law, lien of a judgment, and the right of the
plaintiff to take the lands of the defendant in execution was per-
petual against all the world. In partial regulation of this lien.
statutes were from time to time passed. Among these was the -lct
of April, 1798. It recites that "the provision heretofore made by
law for preventing the risk and inconvenience to purchasers of
real estate, by suffering judgments to remain a lien for an indef-
inite length of time, without any process to dontinue and revive
them had not been effectual," and by its second section enact
"that no judgment to be thereafter entered in any court of record,
shall continue a lien for a longer term than five (5) years from the
first day of the term of which it was entered, unless revived by a
scire facias within said five years." Much difficulty was felt in
construing this dtatute, in reference to the persons and interest to
be protected by it. Throughout the discussion by the bar and the
bench, no one broached the notion that the act would operate to dis-
charge the land in favor of the defendant alone. But had it been
supposed the statute worked an entire dissolution of the lien un-
der all circumstances, the course and character of the discussion
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must have led to an expression of such an opinion. The very sZ-
lence of the judges is, therefore, pregnant with meaning.
In a more modern case, however, it was stated that as between
the judgment debtor and the creditor, the lien of the judgwent con-
tinues, notwithstfnding the lapse of more than five (5) years from
the entry without revival. (Miller vs. Miller, 147 Pa. 546). It is,
in truth but a recognition of the doctrine settled since The Bank
vs. Fitzsimmons, 3 Binney 342.
In Brown's Appeal, 91 Pa. 485, the facts were briefly as fol-
lows: The real estate of a debtor was sold by the sheriff and the
proceeds paid into court for distributlon. All the judgments enter-
ed or revived within five (5) years preceding the sale were paid
in full, leaving a surplus. There were two judgments, the liens
of which had expired, not having been revived within five (5) yeara
and the auditor appropriated the surplus to the defendant In the
execution. Held: That this was error.
The court further stated that as to creditors whose judgments
were either entered or revived within five (5) years before the sale
the judgments not revived had undoubtedly ceased to be liens, but
as between them and the judgment debtor the lien continued, not-
withstanding the lapse of more than five (5) years from the entry
of the judgment without revival. McCahn vs. Elliott, 103 Pa.
634; Bryan vs. Jones, 238 Pa. 191.
The foregoing authorities, therefore established that although
the lien of a judgment may have expired as against the subsequent
purchasers or encumbrances by the lapse of five (5) years, It will
continue the judgment rewaning unsatisfied against the judgment
debtor himself.
Another point raised by the learned counsel for the defendant
is to the effect that the plaintiff was guilty of laches. He further
states where the defendant debtor complains of irregularity In the
Issuing of a fi. fa. after five (5) years without a scire faclas, on
which his lands are sold, he should complain at the earliest oppor-
tunity; If he lie by, he Is considered as waiving the objection by li
latches. The courts In this state have consistantly held that If he
does not take advantage of the Irregularity, he is considered as
having waived the objection by his laches. Bailey v. Wagmore,
17 Sarg. & Rawle (Pa.) 328; Vastine v. Fury, 2 S. & R. 426.
It has been held that an execution Issued after the lapse of the
five years without revival of the Judgment, Is not void, but only
voidable at the option of the judgment debtor and may be levfed
and the property sold under it, If he does not take advantage of
the Irregularity. Bryan v. Jones, 238 Pa. 191; Shields v. Millen-
berger, 14 Pa. 76.
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By an act of the legislature (1836 June 16th, P. L. 755, 42) be-
fore malting the sale, notice thereof shall be given by such officer
during at least six days; to be put up at such places as he shall
deem best calculated to give information to the public of such sale.
Mere irregularities, whether of omission or commission, which
do not render the officer powerless or taint the transaction with
turpitude, may be cured by tacit acquiescence of those who ought
to speak in time. Shields v. Millenberger, 14 Pa. 76.
We, therefore, give judgment for defendant.
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
No question of lien, in the stricter sense of that word, is pre,
sented by this case. The defendant's land continued to be his un-
til the sale, and no other persons have acquired judgments or other
liens against it. The sole question is, was the land capable of be
Ing sold from the defendant on the judgment which was then over
five years of age? The answer is affirmative. 1 Liens, p. 243;
2 Liens, p. 293; Speaking of a judgment in personaum, Clark, J.
said: "When the lien of such a judgment is said to expire, It sim-
ply loses the lien as to subsequent judgment creditors and purchas-
ers, the personal obligation of the defendant, and the lien against
him continues." Haddington Church, 108 Pa. 466.
There is a slight presumption of payment, within five years,
and the scire facias is the means of giving an opportunity to the
defendant to prove payment. But, if the sci fa is not issued, he is
not compelled to allow a fi fa and vend-ex to be presecuted to sale.
He can appeal to the court to stay and set aside the execution on-
proof of payment. The defendant in this case, has not asked the
court to set aside the writs of execution. Indeed, he does not now
allege that the Judgment has been paid. The decision of the learn-
ed court is therefore AFFIRMED.
HARIUSBURG v. AIIMAN
Municipal Liens--Asseesments for Paving-Front Foot Rule--
Averments in Claim-Sufficiency
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The city of Harrisburg paved X street for the distance of sev-
eral blocks and assessed the abutting property owners on the both
sides of the street where the paving was made In proportion to
their frontage. In front of Altman's lot, the paving that had been
done by a former owner, with the consent of the city, was permit-
ted to remain. The city files a scire facias. Altman contends
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that he should not be assessed since none of the paving done was
before his lot.-
Scott, for Plaintiff.
Quinn, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Bower, J. The first question presented for the determination
of the court is whether scire faclas was the proper proceeding for
the city of Harrisburg to bring against Altman for the collection
of the assessment placed on the abutting property owners for the
paving of X street. The counsel for the defendant in his argument
and brief rests his entire case on the argument that scire facias
will not lie. He cited as his authority three cases:
Beighaus vs. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. 289.
Klugh vs. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. 289.
Shoemaker vs. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. 285.
In these cases it was held that the Act of May 24th, 1887, P.
L. 204, and under the authority of which the scire faeas were Is-
sued, was unconstitutional and therefore the scire faeias did not
lie. Evidently the counsel for the defendant was content to rest
his case on the strength of these cases and search no further for
the law on this point. We will dismiss the question by saying that
It is a well established principle of the law in Pennsylvania that
scire facias sur municipal lien is the proper method for the col-
lection of assessments for benefits for local improvements. I A
search of the reports of the Supreme Court will reveal numerous
cased in which this was the procedure followed and a few citations
will suffice:
Harrisburg vs. Shepler, 190 Pa. 374.
Harrisburg vs. Baptist, 156 Pa. 526.
Harrisburg vs. Funk, 200 Pa. 348.
Furthermore, the Act of May 24th, 1887, P.. L. 204, which was
declared unconstitutional, was repealed by the Act of May 23rd,
1889, P. L. 272. The Act of June 4th, 1901 and its amendments
are the enactments under which the present scire faciaq was
brought.
In Township of Scott vs. Davis, 77 Pa. Sup. 352, the court
held that the Act of June 4th, 1901, P. L. 364, as amended by the
Act of May 1st, 1907, P. L. 130, and the Act of June 20th, 1911,
P. L. 1176, show a fixed legislative purpose to require municipal
claims for street Improvements 'to be collected by lien and scire fa-
cas.
This raises the question whether assessmenis can be imposed
constitutionally, for local Improvements. This question Is equally
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well settled In Pennsylvania. In the famous case of Hammett vs.
Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 157, it was held that legislature has the con-
stitutional right to confer upon municipal corporations the power
of assessing the cost of local improvements upon the properties
benefited. It is a species of taxation,. not the taking of private
property by virtue of eminent domain. However, It was further
held that local assessments can only be constitutional when im-
posed to pay for local improvements, clearly conferring special ben-
efits on the properties assessed, and to the extent of those bene-
fits. They cannot be so imposed when the improvement is either
expressly, or appears to be, for the general public benefit.
Assessments on property peculiarly benefited by local improve-
ments and In consideration of such benefits are constitutional.
When a local assessment upon an individual is not grounded
upon and measured by the extent of his particular benefit, it is,
pro tanto, a taking of his property for public use without any pro-
vision for compensation. Hammett vs. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 157.
On the same principle the validity of municipal claims asses.q-
Ing on the lots fronting upon streets their due share of the costs
of grading, curbing, paving, etc., in proportion to their respective
fronts, has been repeatedly recognized.
Pennock vs. Hoover, 5 Eawle 291.
The City vs. Wistar, 11 Casey 429.
The Northern Liberties vs. St. John's Church, 1 Harris 101.
Pittsburgh Orphan's Asylum Appeal, 111 Pa. 135.
In Pittsburgh Orphan's Asylum Appeal, 111 Pa. 135, the court
held that there is some reason why the original cost of grading
should be charged upon the adjacent property, for it received from
the improvement some benefit of a local character; but when this
Is done it has paid for all its local advantages and It cannot be
charged for itd maintanance and repairs.
In Boyer vs. Reading, 191 Pa. 186, the master's report, which
was affirmed by the court says: "Starting with the case of Ham-
mett vs. Philadelphia, supra, following it with Pittsburgh Or-
phan's Appeal, supra, Williamsport City vs. Beck, 128 Pa. 150, and
kindred cases, the Supreme Court has held ad settled law in Penn-
sylvania, that, quoting Justice Sharswood, 'when a street is once
opened and paved, then assimilated with the rest of the city and
made part of It, all the particular benefits to the locality derived
from the improvements have been received and enjoyed.' "
"Such Is the vigorous statement of the law by Judge Shars-
wood In the Hammett case. It is held immaterial whether the first
paving was done by the city out of the general treasury or paid
for by the owner."
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We believe that these principles should also apply where an
individual paves the portion of the street before his property un-
der the sanction of the city and later the municipality In paving
the rest of the street permits this portion paved to remain as in
this case. Nor can it differ if a subsequent purchaser owns the
lots when the rest of the paving is done. The original owner, in
paving at his own expense makes the first pavement. The city
In authorizing It and afterwards In permitting It to remain when
it paves the rest of the street, has acquiesced, given its approval
and adopted it. The subsequent purchaser has in reality paid by
paving at his own expense makes the first pavement. The city
make him pay assessments would be depriving him of his private
property for public use without provision for compensation. As
far as his own property is concerned, it is not benefited by paving
the rest of the street. His portion is paved and he has derived all
the benefits and enjoyments to be derived from the improvement.
Assessments are to be measured by *proportioning the amount
among the properties benefited in proportion to the benefit re-
ceived, that is, their frontage. The property must, however, be
benefited before assessments can be levied.
Furthermore, it is established that local assessments for bene-
fits resulting from the etstruction of sewers or the grading, pav-
ing, etc., of streets can constitutionally be made against properties
immediately abutting upon the improvements, and it Is immater-
ial that the act authorizing the improvements provided for an as-
sessment upon all properties in the vicinity of the improvements,
which are specially benefited.
Orkney Street Opening, 194 Pa. 425; 9 Sup. Ct. 604.
Main Street, 137 Pa. 590.
The present assessment Is laid on property not fronting on
the improvements made by the city but upon an Improvement made
by the previous owner and paid for by him.
Furthermore, the right of a city to so assess abutting prop-
erty is confined to cases of first paving.
City of Chester vs. Holden, 73 Pa. Sup. 465.
Pittsburgh vs. Shaffer, 66 Pa. 454.
Dick vs. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. 467.
Justice Mitchell In Philadelphia vs. Eddleman, 169 Pa. 451,
says: "A first pavement therefore, in the legal sense, which ex-
empts the abutting property owner from liability for any subse-
quent improvement, may be defined generally as one that Is put
down originally or adopted or acquiesced in subsequently, by the
municipality, for the purpose and with the intent of changing an
ordinary road Into a street. It may be macadam or of anything
Olle."
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The municipality could not assess Altman for the paving laid
down by the previous owner for it conlented to his laying it down
and later adopted it when it Improved the rest of the street and
allowed it to remain. Thus far the rule of "first pavement" as
laid down by Justice Mitchell applies to the case.
We believe that the principles outlined in the numerous cases
cited, cover the present situation clearly and definitely enough and
preclude the city of Harrisburg from assessing Altman. We find
that the city cannot assess Altman for the paved part of the street
In front of his lot, nor for the improving of the other part because
his property did not abut it nor did it receive any benefits from it
and to make him pay the assessment would be depriving him of
his private property for public use without provislon for compen-
sation, which is unconstitutional.
We therefore hold that the defense of Altman, that he should
not be assessed since none of the paving done was before his lot,
is a good and sufficient defense, and dismiss this action.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The city had the right to assess the total cost of the paving
for two blocks, upon the abutting properties, according to the
foot-front rule, without respect to the amount of paving done be-
fore the particular lots. Under this rule, "the lots," says the Su.
perior Court, "do not pay for the work done immediately in front
thereof, but for the proportion of the costs of the whole improve.
ment which the frontage bears to the total frontage." Philadel-
phia v. Ramsey, 72 Super. 185. Hence, though the paving in
front of a lot, is not as great as that before other lots, because the
cartway is narrower, 72 Sup. 185, or because a street railway com-
pany has paved a portion of the street before some of the abutting
properties, Scranton v. Koehler, 200 'Pa. 126, it must bear the
fraction of the total cost expressed by the ratio between its front-
age and the sum of all the frontages.
If the fact that the paving is less than before other lots does
not relieve, from any part of the asessment, how could the fact
that no paving whatever is done before it, relieve it? The sup-
posed cost of the paving before any particular lot, is not decisive
of the burden that It must bear. 200 Pa. 126.
The paving before defendant's lot could have been of no value
to the public at large, nor of much value even to him. The char-
acter of the paving on both sides of his lot affects its commodious-
ness, its attractiveness, its market value. That the benefit he de.
rived from it, is, however not as great as it would have been, if
there had been no paving before his lot, is no re~mn for lessening
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his assessment. The foot front rule never secures equality of bur-
den: never makes the cost payable by each, proportianal to the ben-
efit he receives.
The principle that after a first paving, any paving must be paid
for out of general taxation, does not apply, we think, to a pave-
ment In front of one house. Such a paving cannot be deemed a
public enterprise. It is a mere private jmprovement of the ap-
proaches of the house tolerated by the public. The city could have
torn it up, if not agreeable to its plan, and charged the cost of
the paving, embracing this particular part on all the lots.
We thus come to a result different from that attained In the
careful opinion of the learned court below. The judgment must
be reversed and judgment for the plbAntiff, upon the scire facias.
JOHN JONES v. FARMERS BANK
Promissory Notes-Negotiable Instruments--Dishonor-Notice to
Endorsers--Duty of Bank Forwarding Note for Collection.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jones, having a note on which B was endorser, deposited It with
his bank, the defendant for collection. This bank forwarded the
note to A bank situated in the Borough of X, which sent It to the
bank at Y, where the note was payable at maturity. The note was
presented for payment but there was no funds. The notary protes-
ed the note and made out notices to the parties interested includ-
ing B. This notice however was not sent to B, but to the bank
with which B dealt. This bank failed to forward notice to B or
to inforw Jones that it had the notice. The result was that D
waS discharged. Without his endorsement the note was worth-
less. This Is an action for the loss against the Farmers Bank.
Yaste, for the Plaintiff.
G. Miller, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Reed, J. The question to be decided in this case is as follows:
Whether a bank which receives a promissory note and transfers it
to a notary public, who later makes out notices of protest and sends
them to the bank instead of the individual endorser, is liable to the
depositor for the face of the note?
It is not necessary to decide that it is the duty of a bank to
undertake the collection of notes payable to Its customers. If it
in fact undertakes to collect a note, it assumes certain duties to-
wards the depositor of the note. It must preserve the note. It
must, at the proper time, make the effort prescribed by law, to
collect it, or falling therein complete the liability of any endorser.
by the giving of timely notice to him of non-payment.
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That the bank may employ a notary to present the note to
the maker, and to demand of him payment, and should he fall to
pay it, to give notice to the endorser, is indisputable. Bellemire
vs. Bank of U. S., 4 Wharton 105, Moldawer vs. Trust Co., 57
Super. 66. Equally so it is not liable for any negligence of the
notary. Nor is it liable for the notary's failure to notify the en-
dorser of the refusal of the maker to pay the note, and for the
consequent discharge of the endorser.
Has the bank done or omitted to do anything, the doing or
not doing of which, was a breach of its duty? We cannot see
where it has.
In Pennsylvania it has been uniformly held that a bank with
which commercial paper is left by its customers to be transmitted
for collection is the agent of the owners for transmission only,
and is not liable for the negligence or default of its corresipondents
or sub-agents through whom it is necessary to transmit the paper,
if it has used reasonable care and diligence in selecting such
agents. Farmers Bank of Beaver Falls vs. Nelson, 255 Pa. 455.
We think that it would be imposing upon a bank, acting as a
collecting agency, a great hardship to see that all notices of pro-
test were properly delivered tp the endorsers of a paper which It
handles simply for collection.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in the case of Farm-
ers Bank of Beaver Falls vs. Nelson, 255 Pa. 455, above referred
to, it was said: "The jury found that the failure to give notice
to one of the endorsers was the negligent act of the plaintiff's
agents, and therefore judgment was properly entered on verdict for
the defendant."
In the present instance, however, as between the plaintiff and
the defendant we are of the opinion, as indicated by what we have
said, that there was no negligence by the Farmers Bank and no
failure to perform a legal duty, which it owed to Jones.
From a legal standpoint the negligence, which resulted in the
loss, was primarily and proximately the negligence of Jones him-
self in not notifying D, when he received, as shown by the facts,
notice of the protest from the notary.
In Farmers National Bank vs. Peoples National Bank, 263 Pa.
266, it was held, that if the Farmers Bank wanted its agent to
perform this duty, it should have given instructions to its collect-
ing agent as to the addresses of the endorsers, and itg failure to
do so was the proximate cause of the injury resulting to the ap-
pellant. In the present case it was not shown by any evidence that
The Farmers Bank knew the addresses of the endorsers, therefore
it could not have given them to its agent and was guilty of no neg-
ligence.
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For the various reasons we have just recited our decision is
in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The Farmers Bank did not expressly, and therefore did not, as-
sume liability for the neglects of any of the banks whom it was
expected to employ, in making the collection. As Is. held in Farm-
ers National Bank vs. Peoples National Bank, "A bank receiving
a note for collection which it forwards to its correspondent,
owes no duty to see that the endorsers receive notice of protest,
in the absence of special agreement or special instructions to for-
ward the notice, If the holder receives notice of the dishonor and
protest of the note." 263 Pa. 266.
The learned court below has properly held the defendant not
liable. AFFIRMED.
BOOK REVIEWS
Handbook of the Laws of Evidence, by John J. McKelvey, of
the New York Bar. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.
The McKelvey text-book was first published in 1897. Ten years
later, appeared a second edition, and now a third has been issued.
Of the one volume books on Evidence, this may well be termed one
of the best. Principles are lucidly stated, and citations of cases are
abundant. We have been interested, particularly, in the discussion
of Opinion Evidence, a topic upon which authors and judges are
not too prone to be clear and intelligible. The book has merits
which are too well known to need emphasis from us. The issue of
a new edition is timely and serviceable to the student of Evidence.
Illustrative Cases on Evidence, by Archibald H. Throckmor-
ton. Second edition, edited by John J. McKelvey. West Publish-
ing Company, St. Paul, Minn. This edition of cases was originally
prepared to accompany McKelvey's Evidence. The second edition
has been published under the supervision of Mr. McKelvey himself.
He explains In the Reviser's note, that he has preferred compara-
tively recent cases and cases for the most part of American origin,
a plan we think, worthy of commendation. The superstition that
the original expression of a principle, often in uncouth language,
and detached from the facts, is of special value to the student, is
repudiated. The case-book of 557 pages contains many interesting
and instructive modern and American reports.
